University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 19
Number 1 Fall, 1988

Article 9

1988

Recent Developments: B.N. v. K.K.: Fraud,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
Negligence Applicable When Resulting from
Sexual Transmissions of Dangerous, Contagious
and Incurable Disease
Jonathan S. Beiser

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Beiser, Jonathan S. (1988) "Recent Developments: B.N. v. K.K.: Fraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligence
Applicable When Resulting from Sexual Transmissions of Dangerous, Contagious and Incurable Disease," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 19 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol19/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

observations. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that in Greenwood's case, an expectation of privacy in trash left on a public
street did not deserve protection from
police warrantless searches and seizures as
an expectation society was prepared to

honor.ld.
Rather, than conclude that Greenwood's
expectation had been frustrated, the Court
relied on the unanimous rejection of similar claims by the Federal Courts of Appeal.
In each of these cases, the courts found
that a reasonable expectation of privacy
did not exist with respect to trash discarded outside the home and the curtilage
thereof, thus being accessible to warrantless searches and seizures. Id. [Citations omitted.]
On the issue of whether an expectation
of privacy in garbage should be deemed
reasonable as a matter of federal law when
the warrantless search and seizure of garbage is impermissible as a matter of state
law, the majority stated that state law may
impose more stringent constraints in
police conduct involving searches than federal law. Id. at 1630. However, the Court
declared that "there is no such understanding with respect to garbage left for collection at the side of a public street." Id. at
1630-31.
Finally, the Court noted that evidence
obtained in violation of state law need not
be suppressed within the scope of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule when
the benefits of deterring police misconduct
do not outweigh the costs of excluding
reliable evidence of criminal activity. Id. at
1631. Since the state may eliminate the
exclusionary rule as a remendy for violations of that right, the majority held that
it may also adopt a similar balancing
approach in concluding that "the benefits
of excluding relevant evidence of criminal
activity do not outweigh the costs when
police conduct at issue does not violate federallaw." Id Therefore, the Court found
no merit in Greenwood's argument that
because California eliminated the exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of state, but not federal law, the state
violated the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
Justice Brennan, with Justice Marshall,
dissented. Brennan opined that individuals
have the reasonable expectation that the
aspects of their private lives are concealed
safely in a trash bag free from examination
and inspection wherever they may be as
long as the contents are not in "plain
view," thus enjoying protection under the
fourth amendment. Id at 1633. In concluding that an expectation of privacy attaches to any container unless "it so clearly
announces its contents," the dissent
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argued that trash bags are to be afforded
fourth amendment protection. Citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981),
Brennan contended:
[E]ven if one wished to import such a
distinction into the fourth amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to
perceive any objective criteria by
which that task might be accomplished. What one person may put into a
suitcase, another may put into a paper
bag ... And ... no court, no constable,
no citizen, can sensibly be asked to distinguish
the
relative
"privacy
interests" in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio, duffle bag, or box.

Id. at 426-27, quoted in California v.
Greenwood, at 1632.
The dissent found the majority's analysis
to be unpersuasive on the theory that trash
is abandoned and therefore not entitled to
an expectation of privacy. Brennan
explained that an expectation of privacy
cannot be negated when a person seeks to
preserve as private the disposal of refuge.
Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1637. He reasoned
that the voluntary relinquishment of
possession or control over an item does
not lose fourth amendment protection,
even if placed in a mailbox, and therefore
the possibility of such an intrusion by
third parties should not justify a warrantless search by police. Thus, as viewed
by Brennan and Marshall, it was unreasonable for the majority to have concluded
that Greenwood had no expectation of
privacy in his trash. To hold that the warrantless search of disposed trash was consistent with the fourth amendment, the
court "paints a grim picture of our society." Id. at 1636-37.
In Greenwood, the Court failed to
address whether the curtilage question
should be resolved with particular reference to the proximity of the area claimed
to be "curtilage" to the home. Additionally, the Court did not give effect to the
fact that trash bags used by Greenwood
were opaque and not in "plain view," a
factor generally recognized as constituting
items free from police warrantless searches
and seizures under the fourth amendment.
While the Court rejected the notion that
an expectation of privacy may not extend
to garbage placed on a public street, and
that its contents may be seized without a
warrant, it necessarily follows that persons
engaged in noncriminal activity will no
longer be able to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance, as such
is an expectation no longer protected by
the courts as one society now honors.

-Gloria S. Wilson

B.N. v. K.K.: FRAUD, INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS,
AND
NEGLIGENCE
APPLICABLE WHEN RESULTING
FROM SEXUAL TRANSMISSIONS
OF DANGEROUS, CONTAGIOUS
AND INCURABLE DISEASE
In B.N. v. K.K, 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d
1175 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in a case certified by the United
States District Court for the District of
Maryland, held that Maryland does recognize causes of action for fraud, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and negligence, resulting from the sexual transmission of a dangerous, contagious, and
incurable disease, such as genital herpes.
Each named cause of action, however, is
subject to the proper factual showing by
the plaintiff and any defense raised by the
defendant.
Ms. N. was employed as a nurse at Johns
Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland,
between July and December, 1983. Dr. K.
also worked at Hopkins Hospital for part
of that period. From July through
Ocotber, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K. "were
involved in an lntlIDate boyfriendgirlfriend relationship" and "engaged in
acts of sexual intercourse." Id. at 138, 538
A.2d at 1177. While this was going on, Dr.
K. knew he had genital herpes, but did not
disclose this to Ms. N., who neither knew
nor had any reason to believe that Dr. K.
was a carrier of genital herpes. Id On or
about October 1, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K.
engaged in sexual intercourse. On that date
Dr. K. knew that his disease was active and
would probably be transmitted to Ms. N.
through sexual intercourse. That result in
fact occurred and was caused by Dr. K.'s
conduct, inasmuch as Ms. N. never
engaged in sexual contact with anyone but
Dr. K. during the relevant period. Id at
138-9, 538 A.2d at 1177.
Ms. N. brought suit against Dr. K. in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence and assault and battery. The
case was then certified to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland by the U.S. District
Court pursuant to the Maryland Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act,
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann., §§12601 through 12-609 (1984 Repl. Vol.).
The question certified asked:
Does Maryland Recognize A Cause Of
Action For Either Fraud, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, Or
Negligence Resulting From the Sexual
Transmission Of A Dangerous, Contagious, and Incurable Disease, Such As
Genital Herpes?
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Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176. The certification order by the federal court instructed
the court of appeals that:
The sufficiency of the Plaintiff's Complaint regarding the allegations of the
elements of each tort is not part of the
certified question. The Court of
Appeals is asked to assume the sufficiency of each Count of the Complaint as plead by the Plaintiff [Ms.
N.], the facts are those facts alleged by
the complainant in support of her
causes of action.

Id.
To begin its analysis, the court stated the
traditional elements of a cause of action in
negligence:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by
the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct,
for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks;
2. A failure on the person's part to
conform to the standard required: a
breach of the duty ... ;
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury ... ;
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to
the interests of another ....

Id. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178.
The notion of duty is founded on the
"responsibility each of us bears to exercise
due care to avoid unreasonable risks of
harm to others." Id. (citing Morgan v.
Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15
(1975)). Furthermore, "[w]hen a reasonable person knows or should have known
that certain types of conduct constitute an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, he
or she has the duty to refrain from that
conduct." Id. (citing McLance v. Lindau, 63
Md. App. 504, 514, 492 A.2d 1352, 1358
(1985)). Moreover,

J

[o]ne who knows he or she has a
highly infectious disease can readily
forsee the danger that the disease may
be communicated to others with
whom the infected person comes in
contact. As a consequence, the infected
person has a duty to take reasonable
precautions - whether by warning
others or by avoiding contact with
them - to avoid transmitting the disease.

Id. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179.
Referring to the case at bar, it was alleged that Dr. K. knew he had active genital
herpes, a highly contagious, sexually

transmitted disease, that he had intercourse with Ms. N., and as a result, Ms. N.
contracted a serious, painful, and incurable
disease. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that if the averments of Ms. N's complaint are believed, she has stated a cause of
action in negligence that is cognizable
under Maryland law. Id. at 143, 538 A.2d
1179.
The next cause of action examined was
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court noted that the independent tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is sanctioned in Maryland. The four
elements of the tort as identified in Harris
v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611,
614 (1977) are:
1) The conduct must be intentional or
reckless;
2) The conduct must be extreme and
outrageous;
3) There must be a causal connection
between the wrongful conduct and the
emotional distress;
4) The emotional distress must be
severe.

Id. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1179-80.
One does not actually have to intend to
inflict severe emotional distress. It is
enough if "he knew that such distress was
certain, or substantially certain, to result
from his conduct; or where he acted recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high
degree of probability that the emotional
distress would follow." Id.
[O]ne who knowingly engages in conduct that is highly likely to infect
another with an incurable disease of
this nature, and who also is aware of
the nature of the disease, not only
engages in intentional or reckless conduct as those terms are defined in
Harris; he or she has committed
extreme and outrageous conduct.

Id. at 146, 538 A.2d at 1181. Thus, assuming proof of that conduct, the case easily
crosses the "extreme and outrageous"
threshold.
Turning to the severity of the emotional
distress, while it must be severe, the distress need not produce total emotional or
physical disablement. Rather, the severity
must be measured in light of the outrageousness of the conduct and the other elements of the tort. Id. at 148, 538 A.2d
1182. (citing Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App.
at 511, 521 A.2d at 1250).
The court of appeals held that proof of
the acts of Dr. K. establish the first three
elements of the tort under Maryland law,
and if sufficient emotional distress has

been produced by that conduct, in light of
all the evidence, Ms. N. is entitled to
recover damages. Id. at 148-9, 538 A.2d at
1182.
The last cause of action which the Court
of Appeals of Maryland viewed was fraud.
The elements of fraud are:
1) that a representation made by a party was false; 2) that either its falsity
was known to that party or the misrepresentation was made with such
reckless indifference to truth to
impute knowledge to him; 3) that the
misrepresentation was made for the
purpose of defrauding some other person; 4) that that person not only relied
upon the misrepresentation but had
the right to rely upon it with full belief
of its truth, and that he would not
have done the thing from which
damage resulted if it had not been
made; and 5) that the person suffered
damage directly resulting from the
misrepresentation.

Id. at 149, 523 A.2d at 1182 (citing Subur·
ban Mgmt. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460,
204 A.2d 326, 329 (1964)). One who by a
fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a fact that it is his duty to disclose
causes physical harm to the person ... of
another, who justifiably relies upon the
misrepresentation, is subject to liability to
the other. Id. at 150, 538 A.2d at 1182. This
principal has been applied in Kathleen K. v.
Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 273 (1984), a case whose facts are
very similar to those alleged in this case,
except here the charge is that Dr. K. concealed the existence of genital herpes,
rather than asserting that he was free of
disease. Dr. K. attempted to distinguish
this case from Kathleen K. because here
there was no affirmative representation as
to his good health. However, the court
stated that if there is a duty to speak, the
concealment can result in liability to the
same extent that an actual denial of the
existence of the fact would. B.N. at 151,
538 A.2d at 1184.
Based upon the implicit misrepresentation being material and Ms. N.'s assertions
that she never would have engaged in sex
with Dr. K. had she known the truth and
that she suffered damage directly from the
misrepresentation, the court held that Ms.
N. stated a cause of action for fraud that is
recognized in Marylarid. Id. at 153, 538
A.2d 1184.
By answering the certified question in
the affirmative, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has clearly established that the
causes of action of negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and fraud
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will be recognized, when they result from
the sexual transmission of a dangerous,
contagious and incurable disease. However, the plaintiff must make the requisite
factual showing of each element in every
case.

-Jonathan

s. Beiser

A heart attack may start with pressure, fullness, squeezing or
pain in the middle of your chest. It
can spread to your shoulderl?,
neck or arms. Dizziness, fainting,
sweating and shortness of
breath may even occur. If you
experience any of these symptoms for more than two minutes,
call for emergency medical
help immediately. The longer you
wait, the more you risk dying.
Which can be very painful for
everyone who cares about you.

6American Heart
'V" Association
WE'RE FIGHTING FOR
'tOUR LIFE
This space provided as a public service.
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Comptroller O/The Treasury Income Tax
Division v. American Satellite Corporation: OUT-OF-STATE LOSSES SUFFERED BY MULTI-STATE CORPORATION MAY BE USED TO OFFSET IN-STATE CAPITAL GAINS
FOR TAX PURPOSES
In Comptroller Of The Treasury Income
Tax Division v. American Satellite Corpora·
tion, 312 Md. 537, 540 A.2d 1146 (1988),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that out-of-state losses, suffered by a multistate corporation reporting no federal taxable income, may offset in-state capital
gains allocable to Maryland under Md.
Ann. Code art. 81 § 316{bX3) (1957, 1980
Repl. Vol.). The court of appeals determined that a corporation must have a "net
income" as defined in Md. Ann. Code art.
81, § 280A(a) (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.)
before § 316{b) comes into play.
Section 280A(a) provides that the "net
income" of a corporation is its taxable
income as defined in the laws of the
United States, thus equivalent to its federal
taxable income. Sections 280A(b) and (c)
provide items which are added to, or subtracted from, a corporation's federal taxable income to determine its final "net
income." Section 316{b) provides the
means of allocating the "net income" of
multi-state
corporations
between
Maryland and other states where the corporation does business.
The Comptroller of the Treasury made
an assessment of $252,786.36 against
American Satellite Corporation (ASC) for
a claimed deficiency from a $5,000,000
intangible capital gain that ASC realized in
1982. This gain was allocable to Maryland
under § 316{bX3), which provided that a
corporation's capital gains and losses from
sales of intangible personal property were
allocable to Maryland if the corporation
had its domicile in Maryland. At the time
of the Comptroller's assessment in 1982,
ASC's domicile was Maryland (this situs
allocation provision of 316{a) and (b) was
repealed in 1984).
In 1982, ASC filed a consolidated federal
tax return with Fairchild Industries, its
parent company. H ASC had filed a separate tax return, as required by Md. Ann.
Code art. 81, § 295, its federal taxable
income for 1982 would have been
$1,437,808. However, ASC had net
operating losses carried over from previous years that amounted to $51,687,594.
These net operating losses completely offset ASC's federal taxable income for 1982,
thus reducing its income to zero. Consequently, ASC asserted that it had no "net
income" under § 280A(a) and showed no
taxable income on its Maryland return.

Later, ASC acknowledged that it did owe
$14,229 as Maryland taxable income for
state and local income taxes as required by
§ 280A(b), and for personal property taxes
as required by Md. Ann. Code art. 81, §
288(g) (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.).
The Comptroller, however, determined
that ASC owed $252,786.36 in taxes. He
arrived at this number by apportioning
ASC's net operating losses to only
$1,297,452, instead of the $51,687,594 that
ASC claimed. The Comptroller arrived at
the smaller number by making the following calculations: (1) he took the $14,229
(zero federal taxable income plus the §
280A(b) and § 288(g) modifications); (2) he
subtracted the $5,000,000 capital gain, subject to 100% situs allocation under §
316{b)(3), from the $14,229 (allocable
items are 100% taxable to Maryland and
should not be apportioned); (3) this
resulted in $-4,985,771; (4) he multiplied
this number by the three-factor apportionment fraction of .260231 (this comes from
a formula which takes into account property, payroll and sales, which are operations subject to apportionment) under §
316{c), which equalled $-1,297,452; (5)
then he added back the $5,000,000 allocated capital gain not subject to apportionment; (6) which left $3,702,548 as
Maryland taxable income; (7) which was
multiplied by the 7% tax rate provided for
under § 288; (8) which totalled
$259,178.36; (9) from which $6,392.00 was
subtracted as governed by § 288(g); this left
a final tax owed of $252,786.36.
The Comptroller's view was that §
316{b)(3) worked in the same manner as §
§ 280A(b) and (c), that is, to modify the
federal taxable base. He supported his position by arguing that when the statute is
read as a whole, the words "[E]xcept as
hereinafter modified" from § 280A(a),
included the provisions of § 316(b)(3) as
additions to taxable base. Thus, the Comptroller's position was that capital gains
were allocable to Maryland under §
316{b)(3) if the taxpayer's domicile was
Maryland. Since out-of-state profits were
not taxable in Maryland, the Comptroller
felt that out-of-state losses should not be
used to offset Maryland capital gains.
Therefore, he determined that even
though ASC had no "net income" for federal tax purposes, ASC's capital gain
would be subject to Maryland income tax.
On April 16, 1986, the Maryland Tax
Court ordered the assessment of the
Comptroller to be reversed. The tax court
felt that § 316 modifications arise only
"when a corporation has net income as
defined under § 280A." Comptroller Of

The Treasury Income Tax Division v. American Satellite Corporation, __ Md. - >
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